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Sammendrag 
Inntekt fra næringsvirksomhet er viktig i den øvre halen av den personlige inntektsfordelingen, men i 
hvilken grad slik inntekt omfattes av tilgjengelige mål for personlig inntekt varierer mellom 
skatteregimer. Ved å knytte sammen norske likningsdata for individer og foretak, kan vi tilskrive 
foretaksinntekter til personlige eiere idet foretaksinntektene oppstår i stedet for idet de realiseres. 
Denne justeringen fører til en økning i toppinntektsandelene, og størrelsen på økningen varierer 
dramatisk avhengig av skatteregime. Etter en skattereform i 2005 som skapte sterke insentiver til å 
beholde overskuddene i foretakene, er økningen massiv: Når vi tar med overskudd i foretakene, mer 
enn dobles inntektsandelen til de 0,1% rikeste i noen år. Følgelig blir tradisjonelle mål på 
toppinntektsandeler misvisende lave. Vi spekulerer i betydningen av våre funn for nivåer og trender i 
toppinntektsandeler i andre land. De store skattereformene på 1980-tallet i USA innebar et skifte i 
retning av at næringsinntekter skattes på personlig eiers hånd, og vi argumenterer derfor for at 
toppinntektsandeler basert på inntektsstatistikk fra før 1987 antakeligvis er for lave sammenliknet med 
andeler basert på senere inntektsstatistikk. 
 
1 Introduction
Studies of income inequality and, especially, studies of top income shares routinely rely on admin-
istrative tax data (for example Piketty 2003, Piketty and Saez 2003, Atkinson et al. 2011, Aaberge
and Atkinson 2010). This is usually the only type of information that can provide detailed coverage
of the very top of the distribution — the crucial advantage given indications that high incomes have
been growing more rapidly than the rest of the distribution in many countries. Naturally though,
administrative tax data sources reflect the design of the tax system by including only information
that is collected by tax authorities. Furthermore, such data is also affected by reporting behavior of
taxpayers. As the result, reliance on administrative data influences the concept of income that re-
searchers can measure and, potentially, results in non-comparability over time as incentives change.
In this paper, we focus on perhaps the most important threat to comparability over tax regimes:
observability of income related to business activity. Using data from Norway, we demonstrate the
sensitivity of measures of top shares derived from administrative individual income tax data to
changes in the tax regime and implement an alternative accrual-based approach of accounting for
business incomes, which is less sensitive to tax incentives in place.
In developed countries, business income is generally taxed in one of the two main ways.1 One
form of taxation of business income is based on pass-through concept: income of a firm is allocated
to its owners and reported on individual income tax returns. This is a typical treatment of self-
employed individuals and partnerships without limited liability. In some countries, the pass-through
approach also applies to some firms with limited liability. Most notably, in the United States this is
the approach that is applied to S-corporations and limited liability partnerships.2 The alternative
form of taxation of business income involves entity level taxation of firm profits using corporate
taxation and, subsequently and separately, taxation of dividends or capital gains on the individual
level at the time of payout or capital gains realization. Usually, even with administrative data,
researchers cannot assign corporate profits to shareholders so that allocating income to owners in
a way comparable to the pass-through approach is in practice not possible. Since capital gains and
dividends are taxable on the individual level, they are usually observable and the only feasible way
of allocating corporate income to owners. We will refer to this dominant approach to measuring
income as “realization approach.”
1Some countries also have (usually optional) alternative forms of taxation of certain types of small businesses that
are based on revenue or other characteristics of a firm (“presumptive taxation”).
2See Cooper et al. (2015) for evidence on the structure and importance of pass-through entities in the United
States.
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As the result, in applied work business income is usually captured through dividends and capital
gains, but this involves many conceptual difficulties for the purpose of inequality measurement.
First, dividends and capital gains are observed when paid or realized which is, in general, at a
different point in time than when profits accrue.3 Hence, income derived from immediately taxable
sources such as wages, interest or pass-through entities and income derived from (non-pass-through)
corporate tax base are in general observed at different points in time — potentially resulting in
different patterns over time. Second, realization of income influences ranking of individuals in any
particular year and hence interacts with measurement of inequality. For example, it is well-known
that capital gains tend to be realized in a lumpy manner (for example, corresponding to sales of
businesses or life events that result in portfolio changes) and hence individuals move temporarily
up the distribution in the year when capital gains are realized without corresponding changes in
their underlying economic situation.4 Third, some of the corporate income may never show up on
individual tax returns. Gains that are followed by subsequent losses would correspond to positive
and then negative income under a pass-through approach, while only the net amount shows up
under a (non-pass-through) realization approach.5 Unrealized capital gains held until death may
not be taxed at all (step-up approach in place in the United States and Norway) or be taxed as
beneficiaries’ income (carry-over basis).6 Fourth, tax incentives influence realization decisions and
the choice of organizational form (e.g., Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1994, Gordon and Slemrod 2000,
Romanov 2006). Hence, changes in tax incentives can potentially affect measurement of inequality
by modifying the mix of realization and accrual sources of income that researchers rely on.
In this paper, we use data from Norway to illustrate implications and importance of these issues.
Our key advantage is the existence of a shareholder register that allows us to connect information
for all corporations to individual tax returns for all adult Norwegians, and construct comprehensive
3This also naturally generates tax incentives that skew timing of realizations. Some theoretical solutions for
addressing this issue within a realization-based system have been proposed (Auerbach 1991, Auerbach and Bradford
2004) but have not been tried in practice.
4In particular, there is substantial churning among the top income taxpayers. For example, among 4474 taxpayers
who were among 400 returns with highest adjusted gross income in the U.S. in one of the years between 1992 and
2013, 3213 were on the list just once and only 129 were on the list for 10 years or more (Internal Revenue Service
2015).
5Relatedly, corporate spending that benefits owners (see Alstadsæter et al. 2014, for evidence of such behavior)
would also lead to realized income understating the underlying economic income of owners. However, such spending
corresponds to mis-measurement of corporate income as well by inflating costs, so this is not necessarily addressed
by our approach (although, it may be reflected to some extent if temporal patterns of profits and inflated costs are
not perfectly aligned).
6It has been the leading alternative proposal in the United States (it was enacted but never implemented and
ultimately repealed in the late 1970s, and then briefly in effect during the 2010 “repeal” of the estate tax). An
alternative is “constructive realization” that is used in Canada — under that approach, capital gains are deemed
realized at the time of death of the taxpayer and show up as a single lump-sum income realization at that time.
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measures of income that include both individual and corporate incomes. In particular, we allocate
corporate earnings to shareholders as they are earned and retained.7 The period that we study
includes reforms that changed tax treatment of capital gains and dividends and organizational form
incentives.8
Our main results for Norway are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Relying on individual income
tax reports only and excluding capital gains (the red line), as is commonly done in the literature,
implies that the top 1% share (Figure 1) is growing before 2005, spikes up in that year to almost
14%, only to drop in 2006 to under 7% where it stays until the end of the decade, and in the latter
period it is similar to the income measure (blue line) that excludes dividends altogether. This
corresponds to massive dividend payouts in 2005 in response to an announced tax reform and —
most likely — in anticipation of the reform even before (Alstadsæter and Fjærli 2009). Under our
integrated accrual approach where we allocate corporate income to shareholders (in black), the top
1% share is larger — 8 to 17% — and with a stronger cyclical component and a different temporal
pattern. In particular, the correction for corporate income has very little effect on the share of
the top group before 2005, when the tax exemption on dividends allowed for free pass-through of
available corporate income. After 2005, however, the dividend tax provided strong incentives to
retain earnings in the firm, introducing a substantial difference between individual income measured
under the traditional realization approach and under our integrated accrual approach.9,10 Figure
2 shows that these effects are even bigger for the top 0.1% group. In neither of the cases, capital
7Three earlier papers adjust individual income for unallocated corporate profits in Norway. Fjærli and Aaberge
(1999) study the development in income inequality in Norway after a tax reform in 1992, Aaberge and Atkinson
(2010) study top-income shares all the way back to 1875, and Thoresen et al. (2012) study redistributive impacts of
the 2005 tax reform. Related to shareholder income, Fjærli and Aaberge (1999) and Aaberge and Atkinson (2010)
replace observed dividends with imputed total returns to shares, where returns to shares are based on an estimated
marked value of the household’s stocks multiplied by a common long-run average rate of return on the Norwegian
Stock Exchange; and Thoresen et al. (2012) replace owners’ dividends and net capital gains with the proportion of
the directly owned firms’ after-tax income.
8The reform modified incentives to choose different organizational forms for firms and promoted indirect ownership
that allows for more flexibility in taxation of dividends and capital gains on the individual level (see Alstadsæter
et al. 2012, for discussion of these changes).
9Moreover, under our integrated accrual approach, the top income share is largely of similar magnitude over the
whole period (both before and after 2005), suggesting that the approach is more robust to the tax regime in place.
However, the figures also suggest that allocating corporate profits as they accrue actually induces top shares to be
more volatile.
10There are two main limitations of our integrated accrual approach. First, there may still be re-timing of corporate
profits, and a non-announced tax exemption on corporate capital gains from mid 2004 may thus contribute to
explaining some of the high dividends and retained earnings in 2005. Such re-timing is a potential issue for pass-
through entities as well. Second, capital gain may reflect expectations of future profits before they accrue so that
allocation based on capital gains realization amounts to accounting for profits early and (potentially) to a different
party than under the corporate profits based accrual approach. However, as seen in Figures 1 and 2, capital gains
in Norway were quite small during the period we consider, so that the way of accounting for capital gains does not
have large quantitative implications.
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gains make much of a difference.11
While we use Norwegian data, we believe the main points apply broadly. To illustrate, Figure 3
shows top income shares in the United States (Piketty and Saez 2003). Until 1986, there were
strong tax incentives to be organized as a C-corporation — effectively, the equivalent approach
to the dominant current organizational form in Norway. Hence, inequality in the United States
until 1986 was measured in a way that was comparable to the uncorrected Norwegian data. In
particular, given high top personal income tax rates that applied to dividend income, there were
strong incentives against explicitly paying out dividends and toward alternative uses of fund such
as retaining earnings, similarly as in Norway after 2005. Reduction of personal income tax rates
introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 led to a massive conversion from C- to S-corporate
form, the latter being subject to the pass-through treatment (Auerbach and Slemrod 1997, Gordon
and Slemrod 2000) and, since then, there has been a strong trend toward establishing new firms
as pass-through entities (either S-corporations or, more recently, limited liability partnerships).12
Hence, after 1986, reporting of income in the United States is effectively closer to our corrected
approach.
Focusing on the series that excludes capital gains, the striking feature of the overall trend in the
United States is that the top income shares jumped dramatically from 1986 to 1988. To be more
precise: measured income share of the top 1% jumped between 1986 and 1988 by 4.1 percentage
points about equal to the whole change between 1988 and 2010 (4.2 percentage points).13 A non-
trivial part of the 1986 jump is believed to reflect shifting between income and corporate base (Saez
et al. 2012). Our Norwegian results indicate that this jump is likely to correspond to a permanent
11Capital gains in Norway have not been generally preferentially treated relative to other types of income. Before
2006, they were taxed at ordinary rates. After 2006, they are taxed in the same way as dividends.
12In related work, Wolfson et al. (2015) adjust for income of private corporation to understand differences in levels
and trends of top shares in Canada and the United States. Cooper et al. (2015) discuss tax revenue implications of
a shift toward pass-through entities in the United States since the 1980s.
13Mindful of this one-time jump, Piketty and Saez (2003) point to the series that includes capital gains as cor-
roborating evidence of a secular growth in inequality. However, we will show that at least in the Norwegian case,
there is little correspondence between realized capital gains and accrual income As Figure 3 demonstrates, the growth
in the importance of capital gains at the top in the United States begins in 1979, after top capital gains tax rate
reduction from almost 40% to 28%. The importance of capital gains appears to be reinforced after 1982, following
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 that reduced the capital gains tax rate from 28% to 20% and exhibits very
strong reaction to the Tax Reform Act 1986 that brought rates back to 28%. Together, this suggests that realization
incentives played an important role (see Lindsey 1987, Feldstein 1995, for evidence of reported income response to
the 1980s reforms that accounts for capital gains). Hence, the evolution of capital gains over the late 1970s and 1980s
is consistent with changing incentives to realize, and thus need not reflect a secular trend. The contribution of capital
gains to the top income shares on Figure 3 shows that the early 1980s — the period of changing incentives — is only
comparable to the period of very strong stock market dynamics in the late 1990s and mid-2000s. The role of capital
gains during this era again highlights that the approach to allocating corporate profits to individuals is bound to
matter.
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difference in how top income shares are measured under a realization based (C-corporations) and
an accrual based (S-corporations) system, so that the level of inequality before 1987 is likely to
be understated relative to that afterwards. Furthermore, because the shift toward pass-through
treatment continued after 1986 as new firms were increasingly established to benefit from lower
personal income tax rates, this raises the possibility that part of the post-1986 increase further
reflects that more of the corporate income is passed-through and measured in the individual tax
reports.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the Norwegian tax
system and provide details of the data. In section 3, we discuss different approaches to measuring
incomes, their use in the literature, and our ability to implement them. We then present our results
in Section 4. The final section concludes.
2 Background and Data
2.1 The Norwegian tax system and the 2006 reform
The Norwegian dual income tax system levies a proportional tax of 28% on all income, both on
individual level and corporate level, and an additional progressive surtax on individuals’ wage
income. Net capital gains were also included in taxable income until 2006, but dividends were
tax-exempt in the same period.14 To protect creditors from owners excessively extracting assets
from the corporation, the dividends that could be paid in a calendar year was restricted by e.g. the
accumulated retained earnings in the (publicly available) balance sheet of the previous calendar
year — implying that profits accruing within a calendar year could not be distributed before
the next calendar year (this restriction was largely lifted in 2013). The Shareholder Income Tax
was introduced on January 1, 2006, and levies capital income tax on all personal shareholders’
return to shares, both dividends and capital gains, exceeding the after-tax risk-free interest rate.15
Dividends paid to corporations as well as corporations’ capital gains from realization of shares
are tax exempt.16 This means that by holding shares through a holding company, a person may
14In order to prevent tax minimizing income shifting by re-labeling wage income as capital income in owner-managed
firms, the so-called Split model (abolished 2005 for corporations) imputed a return to the capital in the firm, which
was taxed as dividend income. The remainder was taxed as wage income.
15The so-called Rate-of-Return-Allowance (RRA), is tax exempt (but observable as dividends when utilized), and
it is calculated as the price of the share (face value if not traded) times the after-tax interest rate on government
bonds. If received dividends/gains are less than the RRA, the remaining is carried forward with interest and added
to the imputed RRA in the following year.
16Also, corporations no longer get tax deduction for capital losses from shares. In order to prevent large behavioral
effects in timing of the realization of gains/losses by corporations, this tax exemption of capital gains was implemented
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defer capital gains and dividend tax until the income is distributed to the personal level. A special
regulation during 2005 actually allowed individuals to transfer their shares to a holding company,
without triggering capital gains taxes that would otherwise apply. As documented by Alstadsæter
et al. (2012), more than 8% of Norwegian shareholders transferred their shares to new holding
companies during the last months of 2005. In addition, the tax preferred way to organize a new
corporation after 2006 is to establish two corporations, the main corporation with the economic
activity and a holding corporations for the individual owner’s shares of the main corporation. We
account for this in our empirical analysis by seeing through multiple layers of indirect ownership
when distributing firm level earnings to the person owner.
The 2006 dividend tax reform was already announced in late 2004 and lead to widespread
timing effects in dividend payments as documented by Alstadsæter and Fjærli (2009), Thoresen
et al. (2012), and Alstadsæter et al. (2014). Figure 4 illustrates that there was a strong timing
effects in dividend payments to individual owners around the reform, with large dividend receipts
in the years leading up to the reform and very low in the years after. It also illustrates that
dividends paid to individual owners do not equal dividends that are distributed by firms. Overall
distributions actually do not plummet after 2005 (or at least not permanently): firms still pay out
substantial dividends after the reform, but to non-individual owners such as holding companies and
institutional owners.17
2.2 Data
We use very detailed administrative data from Statistics Norway covering the universe of Nor-
wegian corporations, self-employed, and adult individuals (aged 16 and above) over the period
2000-2013. Every resident in Norway is assigned a unique personal identifier that is present in all
databases, enabling us to follow every individual over time and across datasets. The same holds
for corporations. Our data further contain detailed income information from compulsory annual
tax reports for individuals and self-employed firms (covering calendar year). Corporate level data
contain income tax statements, as well as information about taxes paid and detailed balance sheet
information with asset and debt structure. We also have data on the identity of every shareholder
of every Norwegian corporation, both private and public, both widely and closely held, and we
know everyone’s exact ownership shares in each corporation at the end of the calendar year. See
without warning on March 26, 2004.
17The dip in dividend receipts by households in 2001 is due to a temporary dividend tax that was in place for that
one year.
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Data Appendix for further details.
3 Income Concepts
Personal income can be defined as the sum of a person’s consumption and the increase in his/her
consumption opportunities over a time period. Some elements of consumption and consumption
opportunities are inherently difficult or even impossible to measure, and applied work typically relies
on the Haig-Simons approach and considers income as the sum of the market value of consumption
and change in net wealth over a calendar year (Simons 1938). This is often operationalized as the
sum of earnings (return to labor) and return on assets. However, income from business remains a
prominent example of an income flow that is difficult to measure adequately and timely in available
data, especially under the common realization-based tax regime.18 It is also a prominent example
of income flow that blurs the line between capital and labor income — the distinction that need
not to be made when the conceptual approach is based on the Haig-Simons definition, which is an
important empirical advantage of this approach.
We can allocate corporate level income to each personal shareholder according to his/her total
ownership share in the corporation. The total ownership share is the sum of direct and indirect
ownership shares. The indirect ownership is calculated as the product of the shareholder’s direct
ownership share in firm A and firm A’s total direct and indirect ownership share in firm B. In the
simple case of two layers illustrated in the picture,
the person holds a 10% direct ownership share in firm B and a direct ownership share of 50% in
18Another wealth-related income flow that is hard to measure, is consumption of housing. Unless realized in
the calendar year (and not reinvested in the same year) and thus captured as capital gain (see below), we are not
measuring this in our data. But net income flow from renting of real estate that is not the home, will typically be
measured.
10
firm A. Firm A also holds a 30% direct ownership share in firm B, rendering the person’s indirect
ownership share in firm B to 15%. The person’s total ownership share in firm B is then 25%. Based
on this we will attribute 25% of the firm’s income to the person. Since firm B might hold shares in
another firm C, the shareholder also owns part of firm C. In our approach, we also assign shares of
firm C, as well as any further subsidiaries up to ten layers of ownership, to the shareholder.19
To illustrate the importance of business income for top income shares, we define several individ-
ual level income measures. The natural departure point is the administrative definition of ’taxable
income net of deductions’ as defined by The Norwegian Tax Act. Its main components are income
from labor (salaries, in-kind benefits, work-related welfare like sick-leave money and unemployment
benefits, business income from self-employment), income from capital (interest, dividends, realized
capital gains, etc.) and taxable transfers (like disability pensions, elderly pensions, etc., but not tax
exempt transfers like means-tested social assistance, child allowances, health-care subsidies, etc.),
but net of tax deductions (interest on debt, capital losses, various employment related expenses,
some child care expenses, general deductions for pensioners, charitable contributions, etc.). To be
able to estimate top incomes in Norway all the way back to 1875, Aaberge and Atkinson (2010)
rely on this income measure and they discuss the advantages and disadvantages of income measures
from tax assessments. In particular, due to differences in tax systems across countries, as well as
changes in the definitions and deductions over time, it is not straightforward to compare results on
top income shares based on such measures across time and countries. Aaberge and Atkinson (2010),
among others, question the meaningfulness of such measures in the presence of income shifting re-
lated to tax reforms, and they show that substituting dividends with imputed average long-term
returns on households’ stocks yields more moderate increases in top income shares 1986-2005; and,
similarly, Thoresen et al. (2012) also find that income inequality increases more moderately when
dividends and capital gains are replaced by profits of directly owned firms. To pursue systematic
analysis, we rely on a number of alternative measures that single out specific income components
and disallow transfers and deductions.20 The four definitions are as follows:
1. ICGB = Income from labor (including self-employment) + income from capital (including div-
idends and capital gains)
2. IB= I
CG
B – capital gains
19Our main results are similar when we restrict our analysis to two layers.
20Consequently, we will also rely on before tax individual income measures. See Appendix for details on our income
measure.
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3. IC= IB– dividends
4. ID= IC+ individual’s share (s) of corporate income (pi)
We proceed as follows to capture the individual’s share of corporate income. Denote a corporation’s
profits in a given year t by pit and an individual’s (combined direct and indirect) share of those
profits by s. We are going to focus on after corporate-tax profits. We would like to assign spit
to an individual as income. In the case of a pass-through approach, like for self-employed or for
S-corporations in the United States, this is exactly what is going to happen by default. When
the business-source income is not subject to the pass-through treatment, a corporation may pay a
dividend of dt (and an individual’s share of it is sdt). An approach that relies on income realization
(ICGB ) will account for income of sdt in year t and will reflect (at least to some extent and augmented
by return) the remainder of year t profits spit − sdt if and when additional dividends are paid in
the future or when capital gains are realized. Note in particular that the level of dividend in year t
does not have to bear any direct relationship to profits in that particular year: it is purely based on
realization, and dividends in any particular year may reflect current profits, past profits or (within
some legal limitations) future expected profits.
Conceptually, we would like to allocate spit directly to the individual. We do observe profits
so this would be a straightforward task in case of direct ownership. However, since individuals
could own firms through other firms, we need to ensure that we do not count the same profits
more than one time. For example, if a firm B pays dividend to its corporate owner firm A, this
dividend will comprise a part of firm A’s profits (which will again contribute the change in firm A’s
accumulated retained earnings). To handle this, we rely on the (Norwegian) accounting concept of
“earned equity”, which we will refer to as accumulated retained earnings. The accumulated stock
of retained earnings in year t, Rt, is equal to Rt = Rt−1 + pit − dt, i.e additional accumulation
reflects this year’s profits (or losses) with deduction for any dividends. Hence, the change in
accumulated retained earnings, ∆Rt = pit − dt, captures the income component that would have
been passed-through to the owning individual(s) in a pass-through regime (S-corporation or self-
employed). Aggregating changes in accumulated retained earnings across all firms corresponds
to aggregating profits net of dividends to non-corporate shareholders. As a result, the sum of
changes in accumulated retained earnings and dividends to non-corporate shareholders is equal
to the economic profits of the corporate sector. We proceed by implementing this approach: an
individual’s share of corporate profits is equal to his/her ownership share of the year’s change in
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accumulated retained earnings (through direct and indirect ownership) and any dividends received
on the personal level.21
We also considered constructing an additional measure of income “IE= ID+ capital gains net of
previously allocated corporate income” that would partially account for capital gains while retaining
the virtues of accrual-based approach when possible. However, this measure cannot be constructed
unless accrued income over the whole holding period is observed. In practice, we can only observe it
for assets that were purchased during the coverage of our data. Given small quantitative importance
of capital gains for the top shares in Norway visible on Figures 1 and 2, we opted against pursuing
necessarily imperfect implementation of this type of approach. 22
4 Results
Our main results, showing the income of the top 0.1 and 1% as a share of the total income (sum
of the same income measure for everyone aged 16 and above), are presented in Figures 1 and 2.23
21While this use of balance sheet information on accumulated corporate earnings handles the problem of double
counting dividends to corporate owners, it involves some drawbacks. Norwegian corporate finance law prescribes
corporate holding of listed shares to be valued at stock market prices and not at costs of acquisition in the balance
sheet. As illustrated in the following, this implies that an increase in the value of holdings of listed shares might be
double counted. Assume that a holding firm H fully owned by a person P, holds s percent of the shares in a listed
firm L. Further, assume that the listed firm L has profits of A during the year, and to simplify that the profits is
exactly reflected in the stock market value, meaning that the value of L increases by A during the year. We will then
first count P’s share of the change in accumulated retained earnings of L (sA). However, because of the finance law
valuation prescription, the accumulated retained earnings of H will also increase by sA, implying that we count sA
twice when calculating P’s corporate income. However, since retained earnings from large or listed companies only
comprise a small fraction of total retained earnings of top incomes (see Figure 10 and related discussion at end of
Section 4.1), the potential measurement error might not be large. Indeed, we created the top income share plots
excluding accumulated retained earnings of listed firms, and the results are barely distinguishable by eye from those
in Figures 1 and 2.
22It is still useful to note though how capital gains might be accounted for in principle. Capital gains give rise to an
additional set of problems. The value of the firm Vt reflects expectations of future profits (let us denote discounted
value of future profits as piE) and the market value of any marketable assets Mt such as cash or other tradeable assets
(in particular, the value of non-tangibles is reflected in the future profit component and — to the extent that they
might be traded beyond its value of generating future profits — the remaining part should be included in Mt). The
capital gain Vt+j − Vt = ∆piE,t+jt + ∆M t+jt over holding period j > 0 represents the change in the value of these
two components. For non-publicly traded firms, we have no ability to observe changes in prices, and we can only
observe changes in ownership and capital gains at the time of realization, so that we cannot assign capital gains to
individuals on an accrual basis. However, our approach to allocating corporate profits actually does account for part
of the capital gain by allocating earnings as they accrue. If instead earnings were paid out as dividends at the time of
accrual, the value of the firm would have been reduced and future capital gains would be lower. Naturally, the value of
funds within and outside of the firm is not the same, but evaluating it is the question of use (similarly as consumption
or investment decisions of an individual) rather than income. Hence, our preferred approach to incorporating capital
gains would be to adjust them for earnings that have been already assigned to individuals over the holding period —
effectively, adjusting capital gains for unpaid dividends so that the remaining component would reflect the increase
in value of the firm beyond mechanical effect of past earnings. It is clear from this discussion that under such an
approach actual realized capital gains are very likely to be adjusted downward for individuals who are at the top of
the distribution (upward adjustment would correspond to losses).
23Despite strong incentives to pay dividends in 2005, we see that retained earnings still rose. There are two main
reasons for this. First, to protect creditors from owners’ excessively extracting assets from the corporation, the
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In the post-2005 tax regime, when incentives to pay dividends are weak and firms instead retain
earnings, allocating corporate earnings to shareholders (accrual approach) has dramatic impact on
the level of top income shares, more than doubling them (relative to realization-based approach)
when one looks at the top 0.1% of the distribution. In contrast, the effect of accounting for retained
earnings is minor in the pre-2006 period. Hence, our results strongly suggest that the tax regime in
place has a major effect on the inequality measures when using realization-based information from
personal income tax returns.
Interestingly, our results also show that capital gains from individuals’ tax reports play a rela-
tively minor role in shaping measurement of top income shares in Norway.24 When included in the
realization-based measure of top income shares (ICGB ), they shift up both the top 0.1% and top 1%
measures by between 0.2 and 1.4 of a percentage point, with elevated values in 2000 and 2006-7,
but otherwise with no clear temporal pattern and no important qualitative effect on the overall
evolution over the time.In particular, whether or not they are accounted for makes little differ-
ence for the comparison of the inequality patterns arising from the accrual- and realization-based
approaches.
In order to understand these adjustments to inequality, it is useful to first illustrate the behavior
of aggregate series. Figure 5 shows that the Norwegian economy was generally growing during this
period although with more pronounced fluctuations when the very important oil sector is included
than when it is not. The 2003-2008 period was a rapid expansion followed by a short-lived recession.
The figure also shows the accumulated retained earnings aggregated over all the corporations in
our data set. There are two important points here. First, the stock of accumulated retained
earnings grows rapidly after 2005, increasing from about 1/3 to 2/3 of total GDP. Second, we
deliberately contrast the stock of accumulated retained earnings with GDP (flow). Accumulated
retained earnings are unpaid dividends held in the corporate sector that correspond to past earnings
and their stock can in principle be converted to the flow of dividends. They are massive relative
dividends that could be paid in a calendar year was legally restricted by e.g. the accumulated retained earnings in
the publicly available balance sheet of the previous year. This means that corporations could not pay more dividends
in 2005 than what the balance sheet of 2004 allowed. Indeed, our data show that the share of corporations that did
in fact maximize dividends according to the limits following from the balance sheet of the previous year peaked at 73
percent in 2005. In the Appendix, we discuss evidence on dividend maximization in more details and, in particular,
Figure 15 shows that it was widespread at the top percentile just before the reform. Second, even though dividends
were all-time high in 2005 (see Figure 4), profits were even higher (see Figure 6) — and given the legal limitations
on dividends, the profits earned in 2005 could not straightforwardly be extracted in 2005.
24Corporate capital gains in Norway have not been generally tax advantaged — they were taxed as ordinary income
before 2006 and at the same rate as dividends after the reform. Another reason is that capital gains on privately
owned and used real estate are tax exempt in Norway, and thus not captured in our data. This is not so in e.g.
Sweden (Roine and Waldenstro¨m 2012).
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to the overall income and hence the pattern and changes in their realizations are bound to confuse
realization-based inequality statistics, as is evident in the contrast between realization-based income
and accrual-based income in Figures 1 and 2.
It can also be confusing to use aggregate series of profits and dividends to try to reason on
inequality. Figure 6 shows three series: total after-tax profits, aggregate dividend payouts and
aggregate change in accumulated retained earnings. We construct these series aggregating our
micro data. Total profits have been volatile over the period and, in particular, they have rapidly
increased between 2003 (pre-reform) and 2007 (post-reform). This effect partially reflects a booming
economy. Nevertheless, the profit series is in an important sense misleading. It reflects profits of
all firms including corporate owners; as the result, dividends to corporate owners effectively induce
double-counting. Total dividend payouts fluctuate much less than profits and show no decline after
2005. As we have already illustrated in Figure 4, total dividend payouts also correspond to massive
double-counting of income because of the importance of corporate dividends. The flow of retained
earnings is the main component of the difference between profits and dividends. The annual change
in aggregate accumulated retained earnings fluctuated much more over the period. It was small
before 2006, generally increased afterwards but behaved in a volatile fashion, in particular briefly
falling close to the negative territory during the 2008 recession.
These aggregate patterns should be contrasted with the effect that accounting for the change
in accumulated retained earnings has on the top shares in Figures 1 and 2. The volatility of the
change in accumulated retained earnings does translate to some extent into volatility of top shares,
but the effect is not mechanical and and it is quite subtle. In particular, in the post-reform period,
accounting for corporate profits has a massive effect on top shares throughout, even though the
change in aggregate accumulated retained earnings in some of the years (2008 and 2011) was very
small: the aggregate over the whole corporate sector masks substantial inequality across firms since
some firms have large losses while others are successful.
Figure 7 contrasts the aggregate importance of the change in accumulated retained earnings
with dividends and capital gains reported on personal income tax returns. First, as already noted,
retention of earnings appears to substitute for dividends after 2005. Second, in good years after
2005, newly retained earnings are by an order of magnitude more important than dividends and
capital gains combined. Hence, accounting for income retained on the corporate side is extremely
important and there is little hope that capital gains and dividends can proxy well for it; or that,
in fact, they can even account for it with a lag.
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4.1 Composition of top groups and shares
Based on our preferred integrated income measure we construct the top 1% and 0.1% groups,
and then decompose the income of these individuals; see Figures 8 and 9. Not surprisingly, given
our previous discussion, the importance of dividends for the top groups has declined after 2005
and the importance of accumulated retained earnings increased — in fact, the relative importance
of realized and unrealized dividends has flipped. Supporting our approach to measuring income
and its usefulness for accounting for inequality patterns, the overall contribution of corporate
income from all sources (dividends and retained earnings) to the income share of the top groups,
has remained fairly stable. In particular, smoothness of the combined share of corporate income
provides no indication that this integrated way of accounting for corporate source income might be
systematically affected by the tax regime in place.
It is also worth noting that dividends and the change in accumulated retained earnings are by
far the most important component of top income at the very top. For the top 0.1%, they generally
account for about 80% of top incomes, with wages accounting for at most 15%.
Figure 10 documents that the adjustment for retained earnings is driven by closely-held firms.
For each firm we know both the retained earnings and the number of owners, and we can thus
separately attribute retained earnings from firms with up to 10 owners and more than 10 owners.
Virtually all of the retained earnings that we allocate at the top of the distribution have their source
in firms with 10 or fewer owners. This result is consistent with Jacob et al. (2015) who show that
payout of firms held by few owners is more sensitive to changes in dividend taxation than firms
with dispersed ownership. Figure 11 shows the bulk of adjustment is attributable to owners that
have large ownership share in their businesses.
4.2 (In)stability of top groups depending on the approach
An income measure that is differentially affected by tax incentives over time is bound to lead
to re-ranking of individuals, while a comprehensive income measure that does not suffer from
such problems should not result in such re-ranking, unless there is quantitatively important and
heterogenous behavioral response (Kopczuk et al. 2009, Aaberge et al. 2013). Figure 12 displays
mobility of individuals in top income groups over time, and it shows the likelihood that an individual
who is at the top of the distribution in year t was also at the top of the distribution in year t− 1.
It is very clear that when the realization-based income measure IB is used, the tax reform in 2005
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results in significant re-ranking — this is another manifestation of the problems that this method
has with proper accounting for corporate source of income across tax regimes. This re-ranking
has been observed before by Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) and studied further by Aaberge et al.
(2013). Slightly more subtly, mobility of individuals is otherwise lower when this approach is
used and appears even lower after 2005 — this is because by effectively missing the more variable
elements corporate incomes, the top group consists to a larger extent of the more stable wages and
dividends.
In contrast, mobility of the top group using our preferred accrual-based approach Yd is very
stable over time; in particular it does not exhibit a significant trend and does not show any impor-
tant adjustment around the tax reform. It seems that our approach to allocating firm profits to
individuals has indeed made the composition of the group robust this change in tax regime. We
interpret it as a strong indicator that our approach is in fact able to much more closely approximate
the underlying income of individuals than the purely personal income tax-based alternative.
Given these differing mobility patterns, it is clear that the top groups under each of the ap-
proaches consist of different individuals. On Figure 13 we illustrate it in more details by showing
the shares of top 0.1% and top 1% group that are in the top group regardless of the approach.
Before the reform, almost 80% of the top 0.1% and 90% of the top 1% of individuals under the
integrated approach would also be at the top using the realization based approach. Similarity of
the membership of the top groups breaks down dramatically after 2005 and the effect is massive
for the very top group where the methods agree on assigning membership to the top group in less
than 50% of cases.
Concluding, the integrated approach induces an important re-ranking of individuals at the top
of the distribution. By doing so, it stabilizes the measures of year-to-year mobility of the top
groups and corrects tax-reform driven swings in measurement of top income shares. Coupled with
the conceptual rationale for this approach that highlights consistent treatment of earnings as they
accrue, we conclude that this approach provides a much more realistic picture of the evolution of
top income shares over time.
5 Lessons for other economies
While our approach was implemented on Norwegian data, our findings are relevant for other coun-
tries as well. As shown in Figure 3, the United States Tax Reform Act of 1986, which strongly
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encouraged pass-through treatment of top incomes, resulted in a massive adjustment of top in-
come shares. If the whole 4.1% percentage point increase between 1986 and 1988 is interpreted as
increased reporting of corporate source incomes on individual tax returns, it is easy to see from
Figure 3 that such “corrected” top income shares would show no upward trend between 1970s and
mid-1990s, significantly altering our understanding of the evolution of top income inequality in
recent decades.
Alternatively, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 may also have had an effect on reported incomes
through behavioral response and not just reporting. A large body of work on tax responsiveness
of taxable incomes was recently surveyed by Saez et al. (2012). This literature usually focuses on
reported incomes stripped of S-corporation source income and capital gains to analyze the effect
on the remaining “stable” component. To illustrate the potential of behavioral response here, the
top 1% share in 1986 according to Piketty and Saez (2003) data was 0.091 in 1986 and 0.132 by
1988. The top marginal tax rate changed from 50% to 28%, corresponding to the change in the
log net-of-tax rate of log(1− 0.5)− log(1− 0.28) = −0.364. This net-of-tax rate change multiplied
by the estimate of taxable income elasticity (which is customarily computed with respect to the
net-of-tax rate) yields the implied percentage change in top income share for the given strength of
behavioral response. The preferred estimate of elasticity of responsiveness according to Saez et al.
(2012) is about 0.4, which would then imply an increase in top 1% income share from 0.091 to 0.105
— explaining only about 1/3 of the observed increase between 1986 and 1988. The higher end of
the estimates in the literature is about 1 — such large responsiveness could in fact explain all of the
increase (it implies an increase from 0.091 to 0.131). In fact, the most prominent of such estimates
(Feldstein 1995) effectively does amount to interpreting that increase as the response to tax rate
changes. It is important to note that the reporting and behavioral response explanations are in
fact not distinct because behavioral response measured in the literature may in fact be reflecting
reporting rather than real effects.
More broadly, this discussion suggests that simultaneous claims of a large increase in inequality
before the 1990s and low behavioral responses are mutually inconsistent. If behavioral responses
are small, then almost the whole increase in inequality took place immediately after 1986. Absent
real response to taxation, one would be left with either the belief that inequality somehow happened
to experience a one time jump right after 1986 — a very arbitrary explanation — or that the effect
is due to the effective shift from realization-based toward accrual-based approach that the reform
corresponded to, so that top income shares before and after 1986 are measured in a different way.
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Our Norwegian evidence suggests that such a shift has potential to have large effects. Alternatively,
the behavioral response may have also played a role, but one would need massive real responses
to tax rates in order to explain this change without appealing to problems with measurement of
inequality. Furthermore, capital gains do little to correct realization-based measurement problems
in Norway, because they are small relative to changes in accumulated retained earnings (both in
aggregate — Figure 7 — and at the top — Figures 1 and 2) and show little correlation with that
volatile series. There is definitely much more action involving capital gains in the U.S. around 1986
but it seems unlikely that they correspond to profits as they accrue, rather than reflecting profits
over longer holding periods realized at opportune timing.
The key advantage of our Norwegian data is ability to allocate profits to shareholders. We
are not able to do the same for other countries. One may still, though, shed some light on the
importance of these types of issues by evaluating the importance of accumulated retained earnings
(undistributed profits) relative to dividends as well as the importance of pass-through entities
elsewhere. This exercise is still limited by data availability: in the Norwegian case, we observe
balance sheets of all firms while the evidence that follows is based only on large publicly traded
firms with — naturally — distributed ownership.
Firm level profits that are retained in the corporation and not distributed to owners are con-
siderable in most developed economies. Firms retain earnings, for example, to fund investments
internally (Auerbach and Hassett 2002) and, thus, a substantial part of profits is not distributed as
dividends. Figure 14 illustrates trends in changes in accumulated retained earnings and dividends
that are conceptually similar to series presented on our Figure 7 for Norwegian firms, although relies
on a different set of firms. We use data on listed firms from Worldscope for nine large economies
and include all listed firms who had i) information on accumulated retained earnings in the cur-
rent and previous year, and ii) information on dividends.25 We then sum changes in accumulated
retained earnings, as well as dividends, over all firms in a year and convert to nominal billion USD.
We see that the two series are of the same order of magnitude so that not accounting for retained
earnings is likely to be problematic. For instance, for 1998 in the United States, the listed firms
distributed about 200 billion USD to shareholders, but about the same amount was retained in the
firms. As this paper indicates, this is income earned by the same shareholders, but not registered
in the personal income statistics, leading to underestimation of their income, and disproportion-
25We include the countries that had sufficient coverage of the listed firms included in the database, unfortunately
that was not the case for Norway.
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ately so compared to lower income individuals if not explicitly accounted for in some other fashion.
Furthermore, dividends are very smooth (consistently with conventional wisdom in the literature)
while accumulated retained earnings are much more volatile, similar to what we have seen in the
Norwegian case. Finally, the relative importance of dividends and retained earnings varies across
countries — dividends appear particularly small in Japan and more important elsewhere, suggest-
ing that cross-sectional comparisons of inequality across countries may be sensitive to these types
of issues as well. In addition, the tax system in these countries can have large effects on the mea-
surement of inequality because dividend and capital gains taxation has not only large effects on the
level and channel of payout, but also on the fraction of cash flows that is paid as dividends (Jacob
and Jacob 2013a,b). It is worth re-iterating, that these numbers pertain to publicly traded firms
while the bulk of the corrections in the Norwegian case was driven by closely-held businesses.
A careful evaluation of the importance of corporate income for inequality in other countries is
an important direction for future work. This is of particular importance because there is substantial
cross-country variation in the importance of unincorporated and corporate businesses (roughly, a
proxy for pass-through vs corporate tax treatment). Table 1 presents statistics on the importance
of different organizational forms based on Eurostat data for 2011. The share of employment is
concentrated in the corporate sector in countries such as Sweden, Norway, or the United Kingdom.
Other countries such as France, Italy, or Germany have substantial employment and thus also
value creation in unincorporated businesses. To summarize, the importance of corporate-source
unrealized income for inequality measurement differs across countries which substantially reduces
comparability of inequality statistics across countries and the Norwegian evidence makes it clear
that issues of comparability are important even within a country.
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A Description of Data
Our individual-level data to which we have merged corporation information, are based on adminis-
trative registers maintained by Statistics Norway. We use three main data sources. First, we have
individual income tax information (Individual Data). Second, we have information on all businesses
(Corporation Data). Finally, we have the full shareholder register (Ownership Data). Each indi-
vidual can be identified over time and across registers by the same unique personal identification
number provided all Norwegians at birth or upon immigration, and each corporation can also be
identified over time and across registers by one unique firm identifier.
Our first data source (Individual Data) covers all Norwegian residents (about 5.1 million) for
each calendar year 2000-2013. It is mandatory for adult Norwegian residents to submit a tax
statement every year, and we have all these statements (information originating from the Norwegian
Tax Authorities). Individual tax information comprise income, e.g., labor income, business income,
and capital income (including dividends). Our main income measure (ICGB ) includes i) income
from labor, i.e. earnings and other benefits from employers (like private use of employer’s car,
newspapers, phone, child care), as well as net income from self-employment; ii) capital income,
i.e. interest, dividends, capital gains and losses, net income from renting of real estate, etc.; and
iii) taxable transfers, like unemployment benefits, sick leave benefits and pensions (see Steinkellner
2003 p. 40 for details). From the original dataset, we exclude individual-year observations where
the individual’s age is below 16. In total, our statistics are based on 54,423,145 observations and
4,930,201 individuals.
The second data soruce (Corporation Data) comprisesof all businesses incorporated and taxable
in Norway over the 1999-2013 period (including also corporations like banks, insurance companies
and financial holding companies, but not public mutual funds). This data cover the balance sheet
with detailed equity and debt information as well as the profit and loss statement of each corporation
(information originating from the Norwegian Tax Authorities). Using these data, we construct a
panel of 313,249 corporations for which we can compute the change in accumulated retained earnings
for the period 2000-2013. In total, we have 2,059,972 corporation-year observations with changes
in accumulated retained earnings that can be attributed to individual income tax statements.
To link retained corporate earnings from the Corporation Data to the Individual Data, we use
the shareholder register (Ownership Data). These data cover every shareholding of each corporate
and individual shareholder (also originating from the Norwegian Tax Authorities). For example, in
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2011, we have 2,051,354 unique shareholder-corporation pairs for 213,484 corporations, with 689,050
(direct) individual shareholders and 90,590 corporate shareholders.26 The retained earnings are
attributed to the corporate and individual shareholders. As individuals can indirectly hold shares
in a firm, we account for 10 layers of indirect ownership. The final individual shareholding of
each individual in each firm accounts for such indirect shareholdings. We then sum the change
in accumulated retained earnings across all shareholdings for an individual and then merge this
information to the Individual Data.
26Note that we also have information on foreign ownership, but the information is limited to the country of the
direct owner. There are no other identifying information. On average, foreign shareholders account for about 11% of
aggregated accumulated retained earnings in Norway.
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B Maximizing Dividends
We expect corporations to maximize dividends in the last years before the tax reform in 2005, and
to check this we follow the approach of Alstadsæter et al. (2014). To define dividend maximizers,
we operationalize the two main legal restrictions on dividends. First, only accumulated earned
equity from the balance sheet of the previous year can be distributed in the given year. Our
operationalization of earned equity is a proxy, since there are additional factors (which we do not
have data to incorporate) that should be deducted from our measure of earned equity to find the
exact legal limit on dividends. Second, remaining equity after dividend payments needs to be at
least 10% of total assets, again as stated in the balance sheet of the previous year. To be able to
illustrate the patterns before 2004 we use ordinary rather than distributed dividends (data on the
latter not available before 2004).
Some corporations have no earned equity (because they have paid it out in the past or have
accumulated losses) or their equity level is below 10% of assets. Such corporations have no ability to
legally pay any dividends. The remaining corporations can pay dividends. We define as maximizers
corporations that after proposing the positive dividend have the equity/asset ratio of between 0.09
and 0.11 or that propose a dividend exceeding 95% of its earned equity.
In all years, about 40% of the corporations had no earned equity or their equity level is below
10% of assets. Such firms have no ability to legally pay any dividends. In 2005 nearly half of
the corporations that have the ability to pay dividends decide to maximize their payouts. Given
that 39% pay any dividends in 2005, and 62% of those who have the ability to do so, the median
corporation that pays dividends in 2005 does so to the maximum extent possible (see Alstadsæter
et al. 2014, for more extensive discussion). Figure 15 shows these patterns focusing on the top of
the distribution. Maximization of dividends was widespread in the top 1% just before the reform
— at least 60% of individuals in the top 1% owned firms that did so and 20% owned a majority
stake in such firms. The incidence of dividend maximization dropped sharply immediately after
the reform. Figure 16 shows that majority of dividends received by the top group is accounted by
dividend maximizers. These results highlight two things. First, they reinforce our finding about
strong importance of taxation on the patterns of reported income. Second, they indicate that top
taxpayers were facing a legal constraint in their dividend payouts suggesting that large retentions
before the reform (in 2005) were not by choice but rather due to the presence of constraints on
ability to drain funds from the firm. One may presume that firms that maximize payout are not
26
going to be simultaneously retaining earnings. As 16 shows, this is so in all years with the sole
except for 2005, when retentions by dividend maximizers are a non-trivial share of overall retentions.
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Figure 1: Top 1% in Norway using different approach to measuring income
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Figure 2: Top 0.1% in Norway using different approaches to measuring income
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Figure 3: Top 1% income and earnings share in the United States
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Figure 4: Total dividends distributed and received by individuals
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Figure 5: GDP and total accumulated retained earnings
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Figure 6: Aggregate profits, change in accumulated retained earnings and total dividends paid
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Figure 7: Aggregate change in accumulated retained earnings and individual capital gains and
dividends
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Figure 8: Composition of top 1% share
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Figure 9: Composition of top 0.1% share
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Figure 10: Accumulated retained earnings in the top 0.1% by number of owners
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Figure 11: Accumulated retained earnings in the top 0.1% by ownership share
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Figure 12: Mobility of top groups
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Figure 13: Membership in top groups under different definitions of incomes
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Figure 14: Dividends and changes in accumulated retained earnings in large economies
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Figure 15: Fractions of individuals in the top 1% with shareholdings in firms that maximize divi-
dends
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Figure 16: Retained earnings and dividends by dividend-maximizing firms
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Table 1: Share of employment: Corporations vs. pass-through entities
Share of Employment in
Country Sole Proprietorships Partnerships Corporations
Austria 22% 20% 58%
Belgium 9% 6% 85%
Bulgaria 12% 4% 84%
Cyprus 9% 6% 85%
Czech Republic 25% 5% 71%
Denmark 13% 5% 82%
Estonia 3% 2% 94%
Finland 5% 8% 87%
France 11% 58% 31%
Germany 18% 27% 55%
Hungary 13% 28% 59%
Ireland 12% 14% 73%
Italy 24% 22% 53%
Latvia 4% 15% 81%
Lithuania 12% 2% 87%
Luxembourg 4% 6% 90%
Malta 19% 10% 71%
Netherlands 12% 16% 72%
Norway 8% 7% 85%
Poland 42% 10% 49%
Portugal 19% 3% 78%
Romania 6% 1% 93%
Slovak Republic 26% 5% 69%
Slovenia 20% 2% 78%
Spain 21% 8% 71%
Sweden 12% 7% 80%
United Kingdom 6% 5% 89%
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